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Corinna Goodman
Prof. Pushkala Prasad

Abstract
This paper answers the question of why countries react to refugee crises the way they do and
what factors contribute to that response. Germany and Denmark, countries that are similar in
many ways, have shown different approaches to refugees and reactions to the Syrian Refugee
Crisis. Germany made international headlines last year when it opened its borders and
Chancellor Angela Merkel called on other EU-countries to do the same. Denmark, on the other
hand, while having developed an extensive and internationally recognized refugee resettlement
program, has attracted international attention with a new asylum law that can be seen as a
deterrence tactic. This paper argues that the countries’ historical evolvement and past experience
with migration and refugees as well as the composition of the countries’ political and social
sphere have shaped their responses.

1. Introduction
Refugee crises are an inherent part of the international system. For thousands of years,
people have fled their homes for political, cultural, economic, or physical reasons. While the
most obvious and most widely recognized reason is political persecution, war and oppressive
regimes are not the only times people are displaced or decide to move. Social marginalization
and the lack of being able to participate in the social sphere have caused people to leave their
countries. Similarly, economic marginalization and the inability to find employment due to
discrimination or a lack of skill has led thousands to look for a better life in a usually more
developed country. The term “economic migrant” is part of a controversial debate revolving
around the legitimacy of migrants’ refugee status. Finally, water scarcity, food insecurity, and
climate change displace people and cause climate refugees to move to other regions that are
environmentally more stable.
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All of these types of refugees and/or migrants can be found around the world, either
currently or in the past: Syrian refugees fleeing from the Assad regime (political), Jews fleeing
Germany during the Second World War (cultural/religious and political reasons), people from
the Balkan countries looking for work in central European states (economic), and Maldivians
preparing for having to leave their islands due to climate change (climate). The fact that people
are fleeing does not only raise the question of why they are fleeing or how these push-factors can
be eliminated. These people are also going to other countries and the other question that arises is
how these destination countries will react to the newcomers. It is in this context that this paper is
framed.
I argue that analyzing destination countries’ responses and the forces behind those
responses is vital for understanding refugee crises and their implications for the host community
and the refugees themselves. Issues and policy decisions that are related to refugee crisis such as
the question of integration or labor market inclusion can be better addressed when both the
refugee and the country itself is aware of the factors that have shaped the response. These
responses are shaped by a variety of factors. For this analysis to be successful and accurate, it is
necessary to take a holistic and interdisciplinary approach, analyzing each response in a
historical, legal, political, cultural, economic, and societal context. Countries’ responses are
shaped by their historical exposure to immigration and their demographic makeup, the political
climate and specific leaders, as well as social movements and external events.

2. Literature Review
When writing on refugee crises one must take a holistic approach to the topic, exploring
different themes and drawing on historical, political, and economic developments. There is a vast
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amount of literature on refugees in general: stories about refugees’ lives in camps and shelters
(Hugh Eakin and Lauren Feldinger’s Flight from Syria: Refugee Stories; 2015), books on
integration approaches and resettlement policies (Susan Eaton’s Integration Nation: Immigrants,
Refugees, and America at its Best), and historical analyses of past refugee crises (Malcom
Proudfoot’s European Refugees: 1939-52; 1956). In addition, much has been written on topics
that are related to migration and refugees such as right-wing movements and multiculturalism.
An example for this type of literature is Leonard Weinberg and Jeffrey Kaplan’s The Emergence
of a Euro-American Radical Right (1998) which discusses a topic that is often related to the
broader ‘refugee’ discourse. Many books and articles focus on specific asylum policies in
selected countries such as the book Germany’s EU policy on Asylum and Defence, edited by
Gunther Hellmann (2006). Finally, another example is European Multiculturalism Revisited
(2010) edited by Alessandro Silj. This collection of essays takes a country-specific approach to
multiculturalism. Among the countries analyzed are France, Great Britain, Germany, and
Denmark.
The concept of “multiculturalism” deserves a separate discussion in the context of
refugee crises. A country that is experiencing a high influx of refugees always has to address the
question of whether, and if so, how to integrate migrants. Multiculturalism is one approach. It
can be defined as “the embrace of an inclusive, diverse society,” viewing each citizen’s culture
as equal (Malik: 2015). But it needs to be seen in context of assimilation and integration
Assimilation is achieved when an immigrant “renounces his or her claim to a distinct national,
ethnic, cultural or religious identity and blends into the identity of the host country” (Silj: 2010,
1). Integration, on the other hand, “is a loose concept that stands between the other two
[assimilation and multiculturalism] and is common to both … it assumes that the immigrant fully
3

participates in the socio-economic life of the host country” (Id.). The discourse on
multiculturalism does not only include books on different theories of multiculturalism, such as
George Crowder’s Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction, but also pieces criticizing the
concept and analyzing its consequences (Susan Moller Okin’s Is Multiculturalism Bad for
Women?). Finally, case studies discuss multiculturalism in different countries. Examples for this
approach are Alessando Silj’s European Multiculturalism Revisited, John Berry, Rudolf Kalin,
and Donald Taylor’s publication Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada, and Rochana
Bajpai’s article Multiculturalism in India: An Exception?. In the midst of a refugee crisis,
multiculturalism is almost always part of the political debate, prompting journalists and
politicians to either promote a multicultural model or call it a failure.
Looking at the very basic topic of refugee terminology and definitions Emma Haddad’s
book The Refugee in International Society (2008) serves as a starting point. Haddad poses three
questions: Why do we get refugees? When did the ‘problem’ emerge? And how can the refugee
ever be reconciled with an international system that rests on sovereignty? In the first part of the
book, she takes a theoretical approach to the role of the refugee in the international community
by placing it into the broader international system theories of constructivism and The English
School (inevitable and unintended consequences of the system of separate sovereign states). She
continues by analyzing the term ‘refugee’, pointing out that there are a variety of phrases used to
describe migrants such as “economic migrants, illegal immigrants, asylum-seekers, displaced
persons, political refugees, bogus asylum-seekers, stateless persons, B-refugees, de facto
refugees” and more (Haddad: 2008). Haddad also thoroughly analyzes the role of refugees in a
historical context, pointing out the different policies and their evolvement. The third and final
part of the book focuses on a more contemporary study of refugee policies including EU policy.
4

Apart from Haddad’s book, it is journal articles that deal with the topic of migration and
refugees and especially more recent developments. Here the newly-founded German journal
movements- Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung (movements – journal
for critical migration and border regime research) offers an important contribution to the existing
literature. The piece Zwischen nützlichen und bedrohlichen Subjekten (in English: inbetween
useful and threatening subjects) by Philipp Ratfisch analyzes the Stockholm Program, “a fiveyear plan outlining the EU’s justice and home affairs policy from 2010 to 2014” (Ratfisch:
2015). He specifically discusses the ways migration is addressed, from desired legal migration to
undesired illegal migration and finally the case of the refugee. He thus offers an analysis of
refugee terminology and categorization on a supranational level in form of an EU plan.
Another article published in movements, Kämpfe ums Recht (Struggle for the Law) by
Matthias Lehnert, discusses recent developments in European refugee and border protection law.
He analyzes different European political frameworks starting with the Qualification Directive
that was implemented in 2003 and reformed in 2011. The Qualification Directive’s starting point
is the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees which also served as the basis for the distinction
between ‘real refugees’ and ‘economic refugees’ (Lehnert: 2015). Generally, the Qualification
Directive discusses the term ‘refugee’ and its subsequent legal status in the EU. Among the other
discussed policies are the Reception and Procedures Directive and its reforms which establishes
the concept of ‘secure third states’ whose migrants are not considered refugees (Lehnert: 2015),
as well as the Dublin III-Agreement. According to this agreement, a refugee or asylum seeker
can only apply for asylum in one state which should generally be the first EU-state he enters
(Lehnert: 2015).
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Many articles and books/book chapters have been written on asylum policies and refugee
history in specific countries. The above-mentioned book Germany’s EU policy on Asylum and
Defence, edited by Gunther Hellmann (2006) serves as an example, as does the book chapter
Deportation Deferred – ‘Illegality,’ Visibility, and Recognition in Contemporary Germany in
“The Deportation Regime,” edited by Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (De Genova and
Peutz: 2010; 245-262). Additionally, the article Die Asyldebatte in Deutschland: 20 Jahre nach
dem “Asylkompromiss” (The Asylum Debate in Germany: 20 years after the “Asylum
Compromise”) by Hendrik Cremer looks at the basis of asylum law in Germany, migration
statistics, the political and societal climate in relation to the asylum debate, as well as addresses
the controversial status of the ‘economic refugee’ (Cremer: 2013). An article that is even timelier
than the other country-specific literature is Representing the “European Refugee Crisis” in
Germany and beyond: Deservingness and difference, life and death by Seth Holmes and Heide
Castaneda. Writing in light of the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Europe, the authors
specifically look at Germany’s response and, rather than focusing on the legal and policy
framework, pay special attention individuals’ responses (Angela Merkel) as well as popular
movements (PEGIDA and Refugees Welcome). Moreover, the article also discusses the
implications of terminology: ‘refugee’ versus ‘migrant’, ‘voluntary migration’ versus
‘involuntary migration’, and ‘political’ versus ‘economic’ refugee.
As the Syrian refugee crisis is a widely-discussed and current topic, many new journal
articles examine the general issue and themes that are related to it. Many of the articles deal with
countries’ responses; here, not only Syria’s neighboring countries are analyzed, but also
European countries which have been receiving refugees who take the route over the
Mediterranean Sea or via Turkey and the Balkan states. Francois Heisbourg’s article The
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Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis (Heisbourg: 2016) as well as Philippe
Fargues and Christine Fandrich’s piece The European Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis –
What’s Next? (Fargues, Fandrich: 2012) deal with the crisis’ effects on Europe. While Fargues’
and Fandrich’s article was published in 2012 and much has changed since then, it historically
examines displacements from Syria and Europe’s humanitarian and political response to the
Syrian refugee crisis – at least up to 2012. By providing statistics, the article thus gives important
background information. Heisbourg’s very recently published article does not offer as much
background information but places the Syrian refugee crisis into Europe’s current political and
economic situation. It discusses “Europe’s triple crisis” (Heisbourg: 2016): Greece’s economic
dilemma, the rise of radical right-wing and left-wing movements in EU member states, as well as
the UK’s uncertain role in the EU (Heisbourg: 2016). In addition, the article briefly examines
Germany’s role in the crisis, Merkel’s open-door policy, and the subsequent responses by other
EU member states.
An even more specific approach is taken by Nicole Ostrand who examines four different
countries’ responses to the Syrian refugee crisis in her essay The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A
Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Apart from comparing the different countries’ responses she also outlines the limitations of
comparing different countries, pointing to differences in legal framework, definitions of
‘refugee’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ and their implications, and a lack of information available
(especially in the US) (Ostrand: 2015). Moreover, Ostrand outlines the impact of the refugee
crisis in Syria’s neighboring countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt as well as the
international community’s response. Ostrand thus offers a practical approach to the crisis,
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examining actions taken (financial support or numbers of asylums granted, for example) rather
than the legal framework or specific policies.
Additional country-specific analyses are also provided by the German Bundeszentrale für
Politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education) in form of country profiles. While the
profiles provide general information on the respective countries, the focus is on migration. Each
of the country profiles discusses historical developments of migration, current migration trends,
migrant demographics, irregular migration, integration, migration, and asylum policy, as well as
current challenges and future developments (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: 2015). The
agency has a variety of country profiles ranging from Germany, other EU countries and the EU
in general to the Gulf States, Japan, Senegal, and Brazil. Most of the country profiles were
updated in 2015, allowing for a thorough analysis in light of the current Syrian refugee crisis.
I. Gaps and Problems
As the literature review has shown, the existing literature offers in-depth insight into the
causes, developments, and impacts of refugee crises as well as discusses different policies and
related topics. Analyses of refugee terminology is not as common but still exists, especially with
a focus on the supranational level (EU, for example). Most articles focus on policy and legal
framework rather than also looking at the political discourse in a certain country or region in
form of party or leadership positions. Moreover, only very few articles (with Holmes and
Castaneda’s Representing the “European Refugee Crisis” in Germany and Beyond and
Heisbourg’s The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis as exceptions) also consider
popular opinion and political grassroots movements. Some of the articles do take a countryspecific approach or compare different responses. But no clear explanation is given why a
country reacted the way it did compared to another country. Combining both gaps it becomes
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clear that what is lacking is a deeper analysis of how and why individual countries approach the
issue of ‘the refugee’, migration, and integration. The approach, however, should not only take
into consideration the country specific policies and legal framework but should also focus on
political discourse, civil society organizations, and popular opinion. The research question I thus
attempt to answer is: what shapes countries’ responses to refugee crises and why have countries
that are similar in many respects shown different responses?

3. Potential Data Sources
Since the European refugee crisis is such a current event that has garnered much
international attention, much data for the research project will come from media sources. Among
the secondary sources, newspaper and magazine articles as well as TV documentaries or news
clips will be used. Other sources will be policies, directives, and legal framework, party
platforms, speeches, interviews, as well as mission statements of civil society organizations and
platforms of popular movements (PEGIDA, Refugees Welcome movement). Statistics from
institutions such as the EU, UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), as well as other
governmental or non-governmental institutions and news stories will ensure taking into account
the most recent developments of the situation.

4. Methodology
I. The Syrian Refugee Crisis in a European Context
The Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, displacing millions both internally and
externally. As the map shows, most people fled to the neighboring countries Jordan, Lebanon,
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and Turkey where refugee camps were
quickly set up and grew as the war
continued and the threat of ISIS displaced
additional thousands. It was not until late
2013 and 2014, however, that Europe
became directly involved. In September
2013, Germany was the first country to
Figure 1 Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries

pledge to resettle 5000 Syrian refugees, the
largest plan until then (syrianrefugees.eu, timeline). In October, 15 other countries joined
Germany, although most pledges were between 50 and 500 people (Id.). Starting in 2014, more
and more refugees tried to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Sunken boats on the
Mediterranean killing hundreds of migrants made headlines across the world (Ma: 2015). The
crisis intensified in 2015; especially the economically weak states Italy and Greece are affected,
where most refugees arrive. European leaders met to address the issue and agreed on a budget of
2.4 billion Euros to aid countries dealing with the crisis (Id.).
Over the summer, refugees
who have arrived in Greece and
Italy startedmaking their way
through Europe. Countries such as
Macedonia and Hungary were faced
with thousands of people entering
and passing throug their territory

Figure 2 The Balkan Route

(Id.). News stories of traffickers letting refugees suffocate in Austria and the picture of a 3-year10

old refugee on the shore of Turkey made international headlines and put additional pressure on
the international community to act. Since then, individual countries have responded to the crisis
in different ways. It is in this context that both Denmark’s and Germany’s responses will be
analyzed and compared. Before looking at each country’s response, however, it is important to
examine their demographics, relation to multiculturalism, immigration history, as well as legal
asylum framework.
II. Comparison of Demographics in Germany and Denmark
Germany and Denmark are both northern European countries known for their wealth and
welfare benefits. Denmark has been named the happiest country (Huffington Post: 2013) and it is
frequently used as an example of a political ideal (Moody and Rosen: 2016). Germany is known
as a European powerhouse and is seen as a leader not only in the EU but globally. The following
tables give a brief overview of Germany’s and Denmark’s society and economy.

People and Society
Ethnic Groups

Religions
Population
Median Age
Population growth rate
Net migration rate

Germany
German 91.5%, Turkish 2.4%,
other 6.1% (Greek, Italian,
Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian,
Spanish)
Protestant 34%, Roman Catholic
34%, Muslim 3.7%, unaffiliated
or other 28.3%
80.8 million
46.5 years
-0.17%
1.24 migrants/1000 population

Table 1 Comparison of Denmark and Germany: People and Society
Source: CIA: 2016
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Denmark
Scandinavian, Inuit, Faroese,
German, Turkish, Iranian,
Somali
Evangelical Lutheran (official)
80%, Muslim 4%, other 16%
5.58 million
41.8 years
0.22%
2.2 migrants/1000 population

Economy
GDP (PPP)
GDP real growth rate
GDP per capita
Unemployment
Additional Comments

Germany
$3.8 trillion
1.5%
$47 000
4.8%

Denmark
$257.1 billion
1.6%
$45 000
4.75%
Opted out of adoption of Euro
and EU immigration policy

Table 2 Comparison of Denmark and Germany: Economy
Source: CIA: 2016

As can be seen from the tables, Germany and Denmark have much in common. Both are
fairly homogenous societies, with Denmark being slightly more homogenous. Both are
predominantly Christian with a similar Muslim minority. Germany’s population is slightly older
than Denmark’s and, as the population growth rate implies, while Denmark’s population is
slightly increasing, Germany’s is decreasing. Denmark has a higher net migration rate (no
distinction between economic migrants, refugees, and other types of migrants, no distinction
between lawful and undocumented migrants) which can be traced back to its refugee
resettlement program and its small size.
Economically, the countries are very similar, disregarding the fact that Germany is the
EU’s largest exporter and significantly larger than Denmark. The countries’ growth rates only
vary by 0.1% and GDP per capita is only slightly higher in Germany. Similarly, the
unemployment rate in both countries is low, at around 4.8%.
III. Multiculturalism in Germany and Denmark
The concept of multiculturalism has a different connotation and meaning in Germany
than it has in the US. While in the US multiculturalism is seen as positive and essential to a
diverse society, in Germany it is perceived as “a failure of assimilating immigrants” and the
emergence of isolated societies (Noack: 2015). Many Germans expected the guest workers that
came to Germany in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to leave. There was no incentive to integrate
12

them into German society and no acknowledgement of Germany being a country of immigrants
(Phalnikar: 2005). When the migrants did not leave but brought their families, however,
xenophobia towards immigrants grew and attacks by right-wing extremists became a common
occurrence during the 1990s.
The problem of xenophobia has been generally worse in East Germany which has had a
limited exposure to migrants and less experience with democratic governance. The German
Democratic Republic did have a guest worker program with fellow socialist “brother countries”
(such as Angola, Poland, Mozambique, Algeria, and Cuba), but the government did not allow for
the workers to have close contact to German citizens (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung,
Deutschland: 2015). Most of the workers left after reunification, either because they chose to
leave themselves or because their residence permit was not extended (Id.). Xenophobic sentiment
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and attacks by right-wing extremists in the early 90s have
resulted in foreigners avoiding moving to the former GDR Bundesländer, contributing to the lack
of a diverse society (Phalnikar: 2005).
Berlin, on the other hand, has become an increasingly international and cosmopolitan city
in recent years, incorporating “specific elements of immigrant cultures” (Lanz in Silj: 2010).
However, there is still a clear distinction between cultures that are considered beneficial and
good, and cultures that are seen as disturbing (Id.). Following 9/11, skepticism of
multiculturalism grew and the question of whether Islam is compatible with European values and
culture was common in the political discourse (Id.). In more recent years, German politicians
have repeatedly denounced multiculturalism, most notably chancellor Angela Merkel. In 2010,
Merkel said that multiculturalism had “failed utterly” (Smee: 2010). However, she also added
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that Islam is “a part of Germany” (Id.). Five years later, amidst the refugee crisis, Merkel again
announced that multiculturalism was a sham (Noack: 2015).
Similar to Germany, multiculturalism in Denmark has been a controversial topic.
Because of Denmark’s homogenous society, the fear of the “Other” and the “foreign” is
constantly present. Immigration and integration are highly politicized and “immigration,
generally formulated as a challenge to Danish society, is either made an object of cultureoriented critique or treated as an economic problem” (Jensen in Silj: 2010). Jensen defines the
Danish model of multiculturalism as being “structured around the notion of ‘sameness’, and thus
on the notion of cultural assimilation, which in principle does not leave room for difference”
(Id.). Compared to other European citizens, Danes are more attached to the local and regional
level than the European or international one and also have more trust in their own institutions
rather than European ones (Id.). Unsurprisingly then, Danes are more skeptical towards
immigration and foreigners compared to other Europeans (Id.).
The rise of the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party in the 1990s coupled with an
increase of immigration of Muslims brought the debate of multiculturalism to the center of
attention. Many Danes questioned the compatibility of Islam with Danish values (Ghasemilee:
2011). The Cartoon Crisis in 2005, where the publishing of caricatures in the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten was met with protests, both violent and non-violent, in and outside of Denmark,
has exacerbated the issue. Since then, even liberal politicians have denounced multiculturalism
and called it a failure (The Economist: 2015).
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5. Case Studies
I. Willkommenskultur and Asylmissbrauch - Germany’s Response to the Syrian Refugee
Crisis
As mentioned above, Germany was the first country to pledge to resettle 5000 Syrian
refugees in 2014. In the summer of 2015, however, Germany would become directly involved in
the crisis. The summer of 2015 was characterized by Germany’s open-door policy. By allowing
refugees to cross borders into Germany from Hungary, Germany (in coordination with Austria)
suspended the Dublin agreement which requires refugees to register and apply for asylum in the
first EU country they enter. In one weekend, approximately 20 000 refugees arrived at train
stations in Germany and later predictions projected that over one million refugees would enter
Germany in 2015 alone (The World Post: 2015). In the following months, Merkel kept defending
her open-door policy, advocating for a humanitarian Europe, and refugees kept arriving at train
stations. German politicians started drafting new asylum policies intended to impose more
restrictions to curb the massive influx of refugees.
Asylpaket I, also called Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz (asylum procedure
accelerating law) came into force in October 2015, switching back some of the aspects of a
previous reform from 2014. Asylum seekers now have to stay in initial reception centers for up
to 6 months. During that time they also have Residenzpflicht (obligation of residency), cannot
work, and are given non-cash benefits rather than money (although the states and municipalities
can decide on this aspect) (ProAsyl: 2015). Additionally, Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro
were declared “safe states”. Asylum seekers with a high likelihood of being granted asylum
(people from Iraq, Eritrea, Syria, and Iran) can now attend integration courses during their
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application process (Id.). As the restrictions imply, this law is especially geared at so-called
“economic migrants”, people who allegedly come to Germany for economic rather than political
reasons and who are not protected under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.
In November, Germany reinstated the Dublin regulation, with the exception of refugees
coming from Greece (Deutsche Welle: 2015). Additionally, politicians started working on
another asylum law, Asylpaket II. This new law came into force on February 26, 2016 and is the
most recent asylum legislation. It is specifically directed at rejected asylum applicants and
refugees with a low likelihood of being granted asylum. Among the goals of the law are to
accelerate the asylum process, restrict family reunification, and fast-track deportations (Schuler:
2016). To meet these goals, “special reception centers” are to be set up where applications of
refugees with a low likelihood of being granted asylum can be processed quickly (Id.). This
applies to asylum seekers from “safe states”, for example. Refugees also need to have a “refugee
ID” to receive full benefits. This ID card serves the purpose of preventing people from traveling
through the country unregistered (Id.).
Another important change concerns family reunification. Asylum seekers under
subsidiary protection now need to wait two years until their family can join them in Germany
(Id.). Family reunification of recognized refugees, on the other hand, cannot be restricted due to
EU-regulation. The new law also makes deportation of asylum seekers easier. Finally, the new
legislation cuts benefits for refugees by up to 10 Euros as a form of financing language and
integration courses (Id.).
The popular response in Germany has been multifaceted, from pro-refugee movements
pressuring political leaders and people volunteering to anti-immigrant protests and attacks on
refugee shelters. When Germany opened its borders and thousands of refugees arrived at train
16

stations, hundreds of Germans volunteered and donated clothing and food to an extent that the
police in Munich had to ask people to stop bringing items to the train station because of a lack in
storage space (Connolly: 2015). On the other hand, anti-immigrant protests and attacks on
refugee shelters increased after Germany opened its border and many remain skeptical of
Merkel’s position and accuse migrants of committing Asylmissbrauch (asylum abuse). The
events in Cologne on New Year’s Eve, where hundreds of women were harassed and physically
attacked, have increased xenophobic sentiment and raised more questions about the feasibility
and validity of Merkel’s response (The Economist: 2016). Most recently, this has also been
expressed by regional elections in multiple Bundesländer where the anti-refugee party
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) was able to gain between 12%
(Rhineland-Palatinate) and 24.4% (Saxony-Anhalt) (Oltermann: 2016).1
Germany’s asylum laws and reactions to the refugee crisis are complex
and in constant flux. From 2014 to 2016, three different asylum laws have been
passed and implemented. For many, 2015 has become the year of the refugee.
Angela Merkel, by embracing her open-door policy, has changed the way people

Figure 4 Mother
Angela

view Germany and she has left a mark as the “Crisis Chancellor”, Germany’s
Mother Theresa, and TIME magazine’s Person of the Year 2015. Popular
opinion in Germany has been diverse, with pro-refugee initiatives and volunteers
on the one hand and anti-immigrant protests and attacks on the other. Despite the

Figure 5 2015
Person of the Year

anti-immigrant protests and sentiment, the German political leadership has predominantly shown

1

See Appendix Figure 3
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a positive response to the refugee crisis in allowing thousands of refugees to enter Germany.
Denmark, however, has not had the same reaction.
II. Ads in foreign Newspapers and Jewelry – Denmark’s Response to the Refugee Crisis
Denmark’s response to the refugee crisis has been different to Germany’s. The Danish
Parliament passed new legislation in August 2015, cutting refugee benefits by 50% under the
pretext of using the money for integration courses (The Local:
2015). One month later, the Danish government spent 30 000
Euros on an ad campaign in Lebanese newspapers. The ad points
out the difficulties of being granted asylum and states the new
restrictions the Danish government implemented (Frej: 2015).
These include mandatory language courses, a longer waiting time
for family reunification, and the 50% benefits cut (Id.).

Figure 6 Danish Ad in Lebanese
Newspaper

The restrictions did not stop in 2016, when Denmark tightened its border controls on the
German border in early January (Bilefsky: 2016). Later that month, on January 26th, the Danish
Parliament passed a new asylum law that put Denmark in international spotlight and has been
criticized both nationally and internationally. The new law allows the government to seize
valuables from asylum seekers that are worth more than $1,450 (except for items with
“sentimental value”, such as wedding rings). The government argues that this helps pay for the
asylum seekers’ subsistence in the country (Delman: 2016). Additionally, the law extends the
period refugees have to wait for family reunification from one to three years. The law can be
seen as a strategic way of trying to deter refugees from coming to Denmark.

18

The popular response in Denmark has been varied. Some Danes have shown support for
their government’s restrictions. According to a recent poll, 37% of voters were against issuing
more residence permits to migrants (Delman: 2016). Stories such as a night club only allowing in
people who speak Danish, German, or English or people putting up road signs pointing to Syria
and Iraq have garnered international attention (Nelson: 2016; Reuters: 2016).2 Moreover, “70%
of voters felt the refugee crisis constituted the most important issue on the political agenda,”
which can also be seen as an explanation for the DPP’s success (Delman: 2016). Some Danes
welcome the refugees with reservations, arguing that those who are in need (Syrians) should be
granted asylum but those who are coming from other countries and for economic reasons should
not (Nelson: 2016).
There have also been, however, positive responses. A recent Gallup
poll shows that “a majority of Danes want to accept more refugees”
(Haugbolle: 2015). Movements to support asylum seekers, provide aid, and
collect donations were formed while Danish and European politicians
questioned and criticized the government’s actions. Pro-refugee protests
quickly mobilized and many people volunteered to provide assistance in

Figure 8 Pro-Refugee Ad

form of language support or organizing meals (Haugbolle: 2015). When the Danish government
announced that it would place an anti-refugee ad into Lebanese newspapers, a private initiative
placed a pro-refugee ad in the British The Guardian (Varagur: 2015).

2

See Appendix Figure 7
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In order to properly understand why the two countries responded the way they did, one
must be aware of the countries’ historical experience with migration as well as the
development of their asylum laws.
III. Comparison of Germany and Denmark’s Immigration History and Asylum Laws
Gastarbeiter, Anwerbestopp and Aussiedler - Germany’s Immigration History
Germany has always been a country of migration. Throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th
century it was the destination of migrants fleeing from poverty and persecution (Bundeszentrale
für Politische Bildung Deutschland: 2015). However, it was the 20th century that would become
the “century of the refugees” (Id.). Between the First and Second World War, refugees from
Eastern Europe and Russia sought shelter from the consequences following the October
Revolution in 1917 as well as pogroms against Jews (Id.). During the Second World War and
under the Nazi regime, Germany would become a country of emigration. Up to half a million
people fled from the Nazi’s racist ideology and persecution (Id.). The Second World War
severely compromised Germany’s working population, leading to a major labor deficit in the
1950s when Germany experienced an economic boom.
Germany negotiated its first labor recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955; between
1960 and 1973, 7 more agreements would follow and about 14 million so-called “guest workers”
entered the country (Id.). Only about 3 million stay in Germany but many who did stay chose to
bring their family to Germany as well (Kaiser: 2015). The global Oil Crisis in 1973 resulted in
the Anwerbestopp which put an end to the recruitment of foreign workers and completely
curtailed the addition of guest workers from non-EEC (European Economic Community)
countries (DOMID).
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Germany experienced the next wave of immigration in the 1990s when, following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, hundreds of thousands sought
refuge (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Deutschland: 2015). Additionally, a huge amount
of people who had left Germany during the Second World War, so-called Aussiedler, now
returned to Germany. While most (3 million) arrived after 1987, between 1950 and 2013, about
4.5 million Aussiedler returned to Germany (Id.).
Migration has shaped and influenced Germany’s economy, society, and politics
throughout centuries. The 20th century was most notably shaped by Germany’s recruitment
agreements and guest workers. Refugees and asylum seekers did not play a major role in politics
until the late 20th century.3
II. Guest Workers and Right Wing Populism – Denmark’s Immigration History
Similar to Germany, Denmark has been exposed to immigration throughout its history.
Low skilled workers arrived from Poland, Germany, and Sweden from the second half of the 19th
century until World War I and especially German immigrants have shaped Denmark’s
development culturally and economically (Hedetoft: 2006). The different groups largely
assimilated into Danish society (Id.). Denmark also experienced multiple waves of migration in
the 20th century, although the numbers of immigrants were much smaller than those compared to
Germany. Politically and religiously persecuted people sought refuge in Denmark during both
World Wars and even after that, in the 1970s, refugees from Chile and Vietnam came to
Denmark (Id.).
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After the Second World War there was a high demand for unskilled workers, leading to
guest worker programs that attracted people from especially Turkey, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and
Morocco (Id.). When Germany implemented its Anwerbestopp in 1973, so did Denmark. But
with its accession to the European Community (now EU) in the same year, people from other EC
countries were now able to move to Denmark. A significant amount of migration today consists
of people moving to Denmark from other EU countries (especially ones that have recently
joined) (Id.).
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Denmark experienced a wave of immigration
from former Soviet countries. Temporary residence was granted to refugees from former
Yugoslavian countries, Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan (Id.). However, as will be explained in
the next section, the founding of the Danish People’s Party in 1995 strongly influenced
immigration patterns and led to stricter asylum laws.
This section has shown that, similar to Germany, Denmark has experienced immigration
in various forms (refugees, guest workers, migrants from other EU countries). Multiple waves of
immigration shaped Denmark in the 20th century. The following part will discuss Denmark’s
asylum and immigration laws.4
III. Asylkompromiss and Zuwanderungsgesetz - The Development of Germany’s Asylum
Laws
During the Second War and under the Nazi Regime, refugees were often not protected in
foreign countries. For the politicians and constitutionalists of the new Federal Republic of
Germany, the right to asylum was thus of high importance. This resulted in the adoption of an
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article in the constitution granting a right to asylum (UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). Article 16,
Paragraph 2 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (from 1949) reads “Persons
persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum” (Id.). This is the only right in the
constitution that applies to non-citizens and Germany is the only country where the right to
asylum is embedded in the constitution (Castaneda in Genova and Peutz: 2010, 248)
Similarly, the constitution of the German Democratic Republic included an article on
asylum protection, although it was not a basic right. Political committees decided on which
refugee groups to accept (Id.). Over the years, foreigners from countries such as Greece, Spain,
and Chile received asylum in the GDR (Id.).
In the reunified Germany of the 1990s, with the next wave of immigration from countries
from the former Soviet Union, more and more people became critical of Germany’s asylum
policy. This debate was accompanied with increasingly racist violence and radical right-wing
rhetoric (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015; UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). As
Heide Castaneda points out, “by the early 1990s, a concern with Überfremdung
(overforeignization) became a dominant discourse in public debates, and a wave of xenophobic
violence gripped the nation” (Castaneda in Genova and Peutz: 2010, 248). Following the peak of
asylum applications in 1992 (439.000 applications), the German government agreed on the socalled “Asylum-Compromise” in 1993 (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015)
The 1993 reform of the asylum laws changed Article 16 of the constitution and
implemented restrictions on the right to asylum. Asylum applicants who entered Germany via
another EU country or a third country that recognized the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees
now could not apply for asylum in Germany but had to apply in the state they first entered
(Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015; UNHCR Last Exit Flucht). The EU
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adopted this regulation that has now become known as Dublin-II in 2003 (UNHCR Last Exit
Flucht). Additionally, the concept of “secure third states” was introduced. Refugees from
countries considered “safe countries of origin” where there is (allegedly) no political persecution
do not have a right to asylum (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung Germany: 2015). Initially,
EU member states, as well as Ghana and Senegal were considered “safe states” (Id.). The new
asylum reform resulted in a rapid decrease of asylum applications.
The next reform, the Zuwanderungsgesetz (Migration Act), came into force in 2005 under
acknowledgment of the necessity of immigration for economic reasons (KNOW RESET Country
Profile: Germany: 2013). The law recognized refugees persecuted by non-states under the
Geneva Convention and introduced the concept of “subsidiary protection” (Bundeszentrale für
Politische Bildung Germany: 2015). People under “subsidiary protection” do not have a formal
right to asylum or refugee status but are allowed to stay in Germany temporarily if they are
threatened by an existential danger of body, life, or freedom in their home country (Id.). The law
also specified that asylum seekers that are granted refugee status receive a three year residence
permit that also allows them to work (Id.). People under “subsidiary protection” are granted a
one-year residence permit.
The asylum law was reformed in 2014, adding more “safe states” but also loosening
some of the restrictions of the 2005 law. In addition to Ghana and Senegal, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia, and Macedonia were declared “safe states” (Thurm: 2014). Asylum seekers had a
residential obligation and were not allowed to leave the Bundesland (state). Under the new law,
asylum seekers could freely move within Germany after 4 months of their entry (Id.). Asylum
applicants could also work earlier than they used to: the waiting time to start working shortened
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from nine months to three (Id.). Finally, asylum seekers were given money rather than non-cash
benefits (Id.).
IV. Right-Wing Populism and Refugee Resettlement – Denmark’s Immigration Laws
After cutting its guest worker program in 1973, Denmark founded the Foreign Committee
that drafted a new immigration law in 1983 called the Aliens Act. It was considered one of the
most liberal asylum laws in Europe: §7 of the Aliens Act gives so-called “de facto” refugees who
are not covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention the right to asylum and §9 makes family
reunification a legal requirement for those who were granted asylum (Hansen: 2016).
Additionally, rejected asylum applicants could appeal to a newly founded Refugee Board and the
possibility of “spontaneous” entry did not require asylum applicants to have a passport or a visa
(Id.). This liberal and humanitarian approach to refugees was widely recognized internationally
and led to a sharp increase in asylum applications (Jaffe-Walter: 2016). While the number of
asylum applications was just 332 in 1983, it increased to 8 698 in 1985 (Hansen: 2016).
With a significant increase in immigration in the 1980s and 1990s due to the Aliens Act
and international conflicts in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Israel), Somalia, and
Yugoslavia, the Aliens Act was frequently amended. The “spontaneous” entry rule was
abolished, asylum seekers were given less benefits, and the opportunity for family reunification
was restricted (Id.). The issue of increased immigration and integration and acculturation was a
wide topic of debate in the political sphere and during elections in the late 1990s and 2000s.
In 1999, Denmark passed the Integration Act which was the first of its kind in a Western
country (Hedetoft: 2006). It gave responsibility of integration to municipalities and extended the
integration period from 18 months to 3 years. In this time, refugees and immigration must learn
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Danish, “familiarize themselves with Danish history, culture and society; acquire skills and
competences needed to find jobs; and generally participate in everyday life” (Id.). One of the
most controversial aspects of the Act was the monthly integration allowance which was “lower
than corresponding welfare benefits Danes receive in comparable social situations” (Id.). The
Danish People’s Party, an important force in driving more restrictive past and current legislation,
justified the law and argued that one of the objectives of the law was also to discourage potential
asylum seekers from coming to Denmark (Id.). The rise and nature of the Danish People’s Party
deserves a closer analysis at this point.
The Danish People’s Party (DPP) was founded in 1995 and served to be a new right-wing
force that further contributed to toughening the asylum laws in the late 1990s and 2000s and
politicizing the issue of immigration. The Conservatives, supported by the DPP, took over the
government from the Social Democrats in 2001 and ruled until 2011. In that time, it
implemented a variety of laws further restricting immigration. Law no. 365 was passed in June
2002 and severely restricted immigration and rights of refugees. The “de facto” clause from the
initial 1983 Act was abolished. Only refugees who would be subject to the death penalty, torture,
or other inhumane or degrading treatment in their home country were protected (Hansen: 2016).
While permanent residency was granted after 3 years according to the 1983 Act, the new law
extended this period to 7 years. Requirements for family reunification were strengthened as well.
The law also included a “24-year-rule” which mandates that Danes can only marry a non-EU or
Nordic foreigner and settle in Denmark if both parties are 24 or older (Hedetoft: 2006). These
restrictions have been widely criticized by international organizations such as the UN and the
EU.
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Throughout the 2000s, asylum and immigration laws were tightened. Apart from the
governmental setup, this can also be contributed to reactions to 9/11 as well as the Danish
cartoon crisis of 2005 which boosted support for the DPP (Bowlby: 2011). For example, in 2008,
a new rule prohibited “state-funded hostels for the homeless from accepting foreigners who do
not have permanent residency status” (Id.). In 2011, a new point-system was introduced further
restricting family reunification. A change in government in 2011, however, with the Social
Democrats taking over, led to an easing of immigration laws. In 2012, the immigration law was
reformed, eliminating “a fee to apply for family reunification and … replac[ing] … an
immigration test with a Danish language exam” (Freedomhouse: 2013). The election in 2015
changed the political setup of Denmark once again, with the Conservative bloc forming a
governing coalition. Although the Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Prime
Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt won the largest share of votes (26.3%), it was not able to form
a coalition big enough to reach the 90 seat threshold of the 179-seat parliament (BBC: 2015).
The DPP won 21.1% of the vote and formed a coalition with center-right parties including the
Liberal Party or Venstre (19.5%) whose leader Lars Lokke Rasmussen became Prime Minister
(Id.).
While Denmark does have strict asylum and immigration laws, it has found itself a niche
of political influence in refugee resettlement. Since 1979, Denmark has had a fixed quota for
asylum seekers. Especially in the early stages, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), in
cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), played an
important role in the resettlement process (Know-Reset Denmark: 2013). Until 2005, Denmark
had a set quota system that allocated 500 resettlement places for refugees (Id.). In 2005 the laws
changed and the committee was abolished, giving the responsibility of the allocation to the
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Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (Id.). The Danish refugee resettlement
has been considered a success and many people view it as a European model (Id.).
This section outlined both Germany’s and Denmark’s immigration history and
development of asylum laws. As has been shown, both countries experienced immigration in the
20th century and both countries have changed their asylum laws over the years. These
developments are important for understanding how the countries reacted to the current refugee
crisis and what drove those responses. The historical and legal context provides the basis of the
forces that have shaped the current refugee crisis.

6. Findings and Analysis
Germany and Denmark have reacted differently to the Syrian refugee crisis. Germany,
appalled by Hungary’s reaction and headlines of refugee tragedies, opened its borders. Denmark,
on the other hand, took preemptive measures to discourage refugees from even coming. The
popular response has been similar in both countries, with pro-refugee protests and people
volunteering on one side, and anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiment on the other. Both
countries also introduced new legislation. Germany’s new laws were passed to limit the influx of
especially “economic migrants,” declaring more states “safe”, making the deportation of rejected
asylum applicants easier, and generally accelerating the process. Denmark’s reaction and new
law have been criticized for being in violation of human rights and excessively restrictive, being
able to take valuables worth more than $1450 from refugees and lengthening the wait for family
reunification. This section will examine the reasons for the countries’ different reactions.
The first factors that have to be taken into consideration are historical developments and
significant events. As has been shown above, both countries were exposed to immigration in the
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20th century, although Germany received a higher number of migrants. What is unique to
Germany is its dark history of National Socialism and its aftermath. This history has without
doubt shaped German society, leaders, and laws. Germany, unlike Denmark, specifically
included an article on the right to asylum in its basic law. In addition, the concept of building a
wall around a country’s borders as politicians such as Donald Trump or Victor Orban have
suggested is simply inconceivable for a country like Germany and its leaders.
Denmark, however, also has a unique historical and demographic aspect to it that
explains the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment and has shaped its response to the refugee crisis.
Denmark is and has been an extremely homogenous society, both religiously and ethnically, and
its civil culture can be understood as a notion of “imagined sameness” (Jensen, in Silj: 2010).
80% of its population adheres to the state religion (Protestantism) and over 90% of the
population are of Scandinavian origin. The Danish welfare state was founded on those values
and also relies on this homogeneity. A society that is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously
similar is simply more willing to redistribute wealth, based on a sense of solidarity and
egalitarianism. It is therefore not surprising that Denmark has restricted its immigration laws as
Danish society became more multiethnic and multi-religious (Kaergard: 2006). For example,
before Denmark experienced its increase in immigration in the mid-1970s, welfare benefits rose
steadily (Id.). Ever since the mid-1970s, however, when Denmark experienced a higher degree of
immigration, welfare benefits decreased (Id.).5 This demonstrates that homogeneity has played a
role throughout Denmark’s history and, as a result, has influenced Denmark’s societal,
economic, and political setup.
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The homogeneity of Danish society and its necessity for a functioning welfare state has
also impacted Denmark’s response to the refugee crisis. Denmark’s homogenous nature stresses
the role of identity in everyday life. Identity politics have become more important in Danish
elections and have led to an increase of support for the DPP (Jensen: 2015). As a result, antiimmigrant sentiment increased and with it the debate about migrants from eastern European
countries as well as the Middle East (Jensen: 2015). Additionally, Denmark’s homogenous
nature and values of egalitarianism and equality have “come to be seen as obstacles to
integration” (Hedetoft: 2006). Political leaders as well as the general public have raised concerns
about the financial burden immigrants impose on the welfare system (Hedetoft: 2006). All of
these aspects serve as justifications of toughening asylum laws and can be seen to have
influenced Denmark’s response to the current crisis.
Xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment is not foreign to Germany, as the 1990s
demonstrated. However, while political leaders did restrict its laws and amended Article 16 of
the constitution, xenophobic forces or movements did not enter the political sphere as political
parties,6 which was the case in Denmark. The DPP was founded on an anti-immigrant platform
and was able to steadily increase its support. Starting off on the periphery of the political
spectrum, the DPP has made it into the center of politics following the 2015 election.
Support for the DPP also sharply increased after the 2005 Cartoon Crisis which can be
seen as an internal event that has contributed to shaping Denmark’s response. After the Cartoon
Crisis and in light of Denmark’s debate on immigration and multiculturalism, even the center-left
Danish Social Democrats drifted to the right (Haugbolle: 2015). Germany did not experience

6

The recent rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AFD), however, shows that parties
with an anti-immigrant platform are now shaking up German politics.
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such an event, although multiculturalism has been a controversial topic. Refugee discourse in
Germany and debates between the ruling and the opposition parties are more focused on the role
of “economic migrants” and whether or not to declare more countries “safe”, rather than
toughening restrictions for all refugees or creating measures to deter people from coming as is
the case in Denmark.
Another factor that has shaped both countries’ responses is political leadership. In
Germany’s case, Angela Merkel has played an integral part in Germany’s reaction. She not only
initially stated that Germany would welcome Syrian refugees as well as other people fleeing war
and political persecution, but also defended her position throughout the following months and
even after the Paris terror attacks (Abé: 2015, Wagstyl: 2015). By adopting this position, she
made herself unpopular among politicians in her own ranks such as Horst Seehofer, the leader of
Merkel’s sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU).
Merkel usually acts in a calculated and tactical way and has masterfully handled previous
crises in Europe, earning her the name of “Crisis Chancellor”. In this case, however, she acted
spontaneously and hastily. The reasons for why Merkel has adopted and also stuck to her
position go back to her upbringing in East Germany. Her experiences in the GDR and her deep
Christian belief based on the principles of altruism and helping the poor, weak, and
disadvantaged (her father was a protestant priest) have instilled in her a sense of morality and
compassion (Nelles: 2015; Feldenkirchen and Pfister: 2016). German talk show host Anne Will
noted Merkel’s passion talking about the refugee crisis and her ability to talk freely about the
issue, at one with herself (Feldenkirchen and Pfister: 2016). Merkel has made the refugee crisis
her project and she has proven that her reaction to the crisis is something she stands for and truly
believes in as a leader, as a German, and as a Christian.
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In Denmark, it is less individuals and more the general political climate that has
influenced its response. From 2011 to 2015, Denmark was ruled by the Social Democratic party
which eased some of the restrictive asylum laws. The election in the summer of 2015, however,
led to a change in government. As mentioned above, the conservative party with Lars LokkeRasmussen as Prime Minister and the DPP as a supporting party is now Denmark’s governing
body. The DPP’s leader, Kristian Thulesen-Dahl, specifically rejected the position of Prime
Minister, explaining that he preferred “the little free bird role, which can make the Danish
People’s Party come closer to getting our policy through in the real world than you think” (Id.).
Thulesen-Dahl was right, the DPP’s objective of further restricting Denmark’s asylum laws was
realized with the implementation of the new asylum law.
Social movements, both pro-refugee and anti-immigrant, have also played a role in
shaping leaders’ responses, especially in Germany. Protests by refugees and pro-refugee
initiatives in Berlin had already led to loosening restrictions of the Residenzpflicht in 2014
(Thurm: 2014). Though less successful in eliciting a legislative response, protests by the antiimmigrant movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) were
frequent in 2015 and were attended by thousands of people. Attacks on refugee homes increased
five-fold in 2015 compared to 2014 and a high majority of those attacks were driven by far-right
ideology (Schumacher: 2016).7 In August, Angela Merkel visited the city of Heidenau, Saxony,
where a former hardware store was transformed into a refugee shelter. Right-wing extremists
were protesting in front of the store, honking and whistling at Merkel, and calling her a traitor to
the country (Tagesschau: 2015).
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On the other side, pro-refugee groups such as the “Refugees Welcome” movement or the
activists of the Zentrum für Politische Schönheit (Center for Political Beauty) have criticized
Merkel for not speaking out against right-wing extremism and attacks against refugees earlier.
For example, the Zentrum für Politische Schönheit organized an events in Berlin in July where
activists dug graves for refugees who died on the Mediterranean to raise awareness to the issue
and criticize the German government’s and the European Union’s reaction (or lack thereof) to
the refugee crisis (Zentrum für Politische Schönheit: 2016). Merkel’s experience in Heidenau as
well as the demands from pro-refugee activists can be seen as putting pressure on the chancellor
to not only firmly speak out against right-wing extremism but also contribute to solving the
crisis.
Finally, external events have played a role in Germany’s response to the refugee crisis
but can be understood in the context of further pressuring political leaders to act. In the days
leading up to Germany opening its borders, international headlines were filled with pictures of a
3-year old refugee boy who drowned on the Turkish shore. A few days earlier, 71 refugees
suffocated in a truck in Austria. These tragedies definitely leave a mark on a political leader like
Angela Merkel who, as mentioned above, is strongly influenced by Christian values and
morality.

7. Conclusion
I. Summary
This paper has demonstrated that responses to refugee crises cannot be viewed through
one lens only. Governments and political leaders initially either responded in a positive way, by
welcoming refugees and granting them asylum, or in a negative way, by taking measures to deter
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more people from coming. These responses, however, are not absolute but in constant flux. As
the example of Germany shows, despite Merkel’s initial full embrace of the open-door policy,
multiple laws intending to restrict the influx have been passed.
One could question Germany’s positive response given that it did restrict its laws in the
months following the initial massive influx. However, it must be acknowledged that there is a
difference between laws and measures intended to deter all refugees from coming (jewelry law,
newspaper ad) and laws intended to restrict the influx of migrants that already have a very slim
chance of being granted asylum (Asylpaket I and II). The debate around the legitimacy of
“economic migrants’” refugee status is very controversial in Germany and was not extensively
discussed in this paper for the purpose of space. It should be noted, however, that there are
parties (Die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) that view Germany’s current legislation as too
restrictive and as acting as a deterrence.
Popular responses in Germany and Denmark have been similar, with pro-refugee protests
and initiatives on the one hand, and anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks on the other side. The
negative popular response in Denmark seems less structured and streamlined than the negative
response in Germany, which is to a large extent organized by and connected to the social
movement PEGIDA. This might be related to the fact that the Danish government’s response is
already very restrictive. General skepticism towards foreigners and xenophobia in Denmark can
be seen as resulting from the homogenous character of Danish Welfare State. The positive
popular response, on the other hand, is similar in both countries, with pro-refugee initiatives and
volunteers pressuring leaders to adopt less restrictive policies.
Both cases have shown that one cannot understand countries’ responses without taking a
holistic approach. The countries’ responses must be seen in a historical context, looking at
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exposure to immigration and the development of legal framework. Denmark is interesting as it
initially implemented very liberal asylum policies that were only over time restricted but now
have evolved into some of the most restrictive in the EU. Here the relationship between Danish
homogeneity, the Welfare State, and an increase in immigration played a role. Germany has
experienced steady waves of immigration and has restricted and liberalized its laws throughout
time.
Political leaders and the general political climate have similarly played an important role
in the countries’ responses. Since the founding of the DPP in 1995, Denmark’s political spectrum
seems to have steadily shifted to the right, with skepticism towards foreigners at best, and antiimmigrant sentiment at worst becoming the new normal. It is questionable whether the German
leadership would have reacted the same way without Angela Merkel. Influenced by her
upbringing, faith, and morality, she views her response to the crisis as a rational one, the right
thing to do, and the only option in light of external events and tragedies. The influence of social
movements in pressuring political leaders, however, should also be noted.
II. Limitations
One argument that was has not been addressed in my paper is related to Germany’s
declining population. Some could argue that Germany’s or Angela Merkel’s response is driven
by the country’s shrinking population and need for especially low-skilled workers to fill the gaps
in the labor market. There is merit to this argument and political leaders could use this argument
to “sell” a more liberal approach to the refugee crisis to the public. However, having analyzed
Merkel’s response and her background, this aspect has not been one of the deciding forces of
Germany’s response. It can be viewed as a positive unintended influence but not as a prime
factor that shaped Merkel’s or Germany’s response. Legal measures to restrict immigration from
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“safe states”, whose citizens could just as well fill the gaps in the labor market, also shows that
this cannot be seen as a major influence.
III. Future Research
It would be incorrect to say that refugee crises are understudied. As the literature review
has shown, there is a vast amount of literature on refugee crises and related topics. However,
there are also still gaps in the literature. This paper has attempted to fill one of them by
examining the forces behind responses to refugee crises. Further research could look at the
implications of these responses for European society and demographic structure. Similarly, it
would be interesting to combine some of the research done on related topics with the current
refugee crisis. Anti-immigrant right-wing parties have steadily increased their support in
different European countries such as France, Denmark, and the UK. How does this rise relate to
refugee crises and countries’ responses to them? And what are the implications of the rise of
these right-wing parties? With Germany’s AFD having gained more support in recent elections,
will it be the next country with an anti-immigrant party in a governing coalition in the future?
Further research could take the approach taken in this paper to another level, by
comparing the forces driving responses to refugee crises in countries that have dealt with
different types of refugee crises. For example, how does a country respond to a refugee crises
that was caused by climate change? Are responses and driving forces different from those of
refugee crises caused by political and/or economic factors? Have forces driving countries’
responses changed over time? If so, what accounts for this change? How have refugee crises
changed over time and in an increasingly globalized world?

36

Refugee crises are complex and there will always be more topics to study. As with every
topic, the researcher has to cast a wide net and look at all aspects to be able to come to a
conclusion. By analyzing the different forces driving responses to refugee crises, this paper has
examined the cultural, economic, and political implications of refugee crises in the context of
responses of destination countries and has demonstrated that history, leadership, social context,
and internal and external events shape countries’ responses.
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8. Appendix
Figure 1: Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries:

Source: Owen: 2013

Figure 2: The Balkan Route

Source: Arapi: 2015
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Figure 3: German Regional Elections 2016

Source: The Economist: 3/2015
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Figure 4: Mother Angela

Figure 5: 2015 Person of the Year

Source: Nelles: 2015

Source: Lee: 2015

Figure 6: Danish Ad in Lebanese Newspaper

Figure 7: Iraq Road Sign

Source: Reuters: 2016

Source: Frej: 2015

Figure 8: Pro-Refugee Ad

Source: Varagur: 2015

40

Figure 9: Migration to Germany

Source: openmigration.org: 2016

Figure 10: Migration to Denmark

Source: Bendixen: 2016
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Figure 11: Unemployment Benefit Relative to Average Wage

Source: Kaergard: 2006
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Figure 12: Religious Belief in Denmark

Source: Kaergard: 2006
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Figure 13: Attacks on Refugee Homes in 2014 and 2015 in Germany

Source: Schumacher: 2016
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